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Some Remaining Problems 
for Fictional File Theory 
A Short Reply to Eleonora Orlando
Zoltán Vecsey
Mental file theory has recently attracted growing interest among philosophers of mind and philosophers 
of language. Some experts are of the opinion that the insights of file theory may also be helpful 
in understanding the problems of fictionality. Orlando (2017) offered a specific version of fictional file 
theory to which she added later certain clarifications and corrections. In this paper I will first try to show 
that while Orlando’s  updated account of fiction is original and inspirative, it still suffers from some 
problems. Then I briefly delineate an alternative view, which is linguistic rather than mentalistic in its 
orientation. But, instead of arguing for the superiority of that view, I  will conclude that the main 
challenge for the theory of fiction is to find an explanatory level where the mental and linguistic aspects 
of artworks can be treated simultaneously. | Keywords: Mental Files, Concepts, Fiction, Fictional Names, 
Representation
The literature on mental file theory seems to be uniform in one respect: every 
supporter of this theory agrees that files can and ought to play an explanatory 
role in understanding the fundamental mechanisms of thinking. More 
concretely, files are supposed to have an explanatory potential that can enlarge 
our knowledge about the generation and content of singular thoughts. One of 
the most often analyzed cases related to the mental phenomenon of singular 
thought is our knowledge of persons. Let us take Sigourney Weaver as 
an  example. Presumably, even average movie fans know that Weaver is 
an  American actress featuring in the Alien franchise and many other movies 
like Gorillas in the Mist and Death and the Maiden. They may also know that she 
was born in New York City and that she has a  daughter named Charlotte. 
The  leading idea of file theory is that thinkers collect and organize these 
various pieces of information into particular mental files. In their first 
encounter with this person, thinkers open a new file in their mind and label it 
with the name ‘Weaver’. The WEAVER file then begins to be filled with mental 
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1 An early articulation of this view is to be found in Recanati (2013, 2014). Note, however, that 
on Recanati’s view files without target objects may exist only as thought-vehicles that are 
unsuitable to generate contentful thoughts. 
2 Orlando’s two level semantics rests on the assumption that mental predicates can be 
conceived of as concepts. Note, however, that this is not a trivial assumption. For a critical 
position on this point, see Losada (2016).
predicates such as ‘features in movies’ or ‘has a  daughter’. It is important to 
stress, however, that the file has to be individuated relationally, not through 
the satisfaction of each of the collected mental predicates. One might believe, 
falsely, that Weaver won a Golden Globe Award in 1999 and thus include in her 
WEAVER file the predicate ‘won a  Golden Globe Award’. Mental files may 
contain such kinds of misinformation and still be about a  particular person. 
This is so  because the individuation of files requires that thinkers stand 
in acquaintance relations to the targets of their files. Those who want to open 
a file about Weaver must already be connected to the person of Weaver through 
perception, testimony or some other epistemically rewarding relation.
The latter requirement is not absolutely general, however. The Weaver example 
merely illustrates that in paradigmatic, everyday cases the existence of mental 
files depends on the existence of their target objects. But it is not a necessary 
condition on the existence of files that thinkers stand in an epistemically 
rewarding relation to something in the mind-external domain. Imagined or 
expected epistemic relations to objects may also be sufficient conditions for 
opening files. Moreover, one can plausibly argue that files can be opened even 
in cases where there is no appropriate external object about which we could 
gather storable information.1 Such relatively liberal conditions on file 
existence encouraged some theorists to apply the mental file framework to the 
domain of fiction. 
Eleonora Orlando (2017) was among the firsts to argue for extending 
the theory of mental files to the treatment of fictional discourse. Even at first 
sight, this is not an easy enterprise. Thus, it is not surprising that some familiar 
hypotheses of the orthodox file theory must have been reinterpreted by 
Orlando. First, in order to explain how ordinary proper names can be used to 
express singular contents, she supplemented the mental file framework with 
a  two-level semantics. The key point of this semantics is that declarative 
statements like ‘Weaver is an actress’ express two kinds of proposition 
simultaneously, a  singular and a  conceptual one. While the singular 
proposition is a Russellian proposition, which contains an object (Weaver) and 
a  property (being an actress) as constituents, the conceptual proposition is 
built up from the WEAVER file and the descriptive concept ACTRESS. 
The conceptual proposition counts also as singular due to the fact that one of 
its building blocks, the WEAVER file, is directly related to the person of Weaver. 
The advantage of this two-level account of semantics in this context is that it is 
truth-conditional because it regards singular propositions as bearers of truth 
values, but it also illuminates how mental files get involved in the contents 
expressed by declarative statements.2 Second, in order to show that this two-
level semantics can be applied to fictional names, Orlando introduced the 
notion of oblique context into the mental file framework. In contrast 
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to  ordinary proper names, fictional names lack referents. While ‘Sigourney 
Weaver’ refers to a person, there is no individual or person to which ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’ refers. This generates a  well-known interpretive problem since in its 
fiction-internal uses ‘Sherlock Holmes’ appears to refer to a  detective. 
The  notion of oblique context may help to solve this problem. For one can 
argue that fictional statements generate oblique contexts in which proper 
names do  not refer to their customary referents but refer to their customary 
senses. And then, since mental files are to be conceived as senses of proper 
names, in  its fiction-internal uses ‘Sherlock Holmes’ may be taken to refer to 
the HOLMES file. According to Orlando, the semantic effects of this kind of 
referential shift can also be observed in fiction-external uses of ‘Sherlock 
Holmes’, but the shifting mechanism is operative even in such cases where one 
interprets the Holmes narrative from a mixed internal/external perspective.
In my (2020) paper, I  have criticized this view by arguing that it rests on 
an  implausible understanding of referential shift. Some kinds of nominal 
expressions – typically, indexicals and demonstratives – shift their reference in 
a  systematic way. The first-person pronoun ‘I’, for example, may refer to 
different persons in different contexts, depending on the identity of the person 
who uses that pronoun. Most semanticists think that the context-sensitivity of 
these expressions is encoded in their lexical profiles. It is implausible to think, 
however, that fictional names can shift their referents in that way. Purely 
fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ are introduced by their authors as empty 
names. Their semantic status is dependent on the circumstances under which 
they become part of a narrative discourse. If ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not refer 
to anything at the occasion of its first occurrence in a  narrative story, no 
context-sensitive lexical rule can modify the direction of this dependence 
relation. But, as mentioned, Orlando (2017) suggested that in oblique contexts 
fictional names change their semantic status and become referential 
expressions. The source of these changes was supposed to be a specific sort of 
authorial intention, which was called ‘simulative intention’. The problem with 
this explanation is that it seems intuitively equally implausible to think that 
authors have such intentions when they introduce names for their 
protagonists.
In a  later paper in this journal, Orlando (2021a) responded to this critique in 
the following way. It is a  mistake to interpret the phenomenon of referential 
shift as if it were based on a self-reflective attitude: simulative intentions are 
not controlled by other, second-order thoughts. Authors have indeed such 
intentions, that is, they intend to refer with their invented names to mental 
files, but they are not consciously aware of this intentional shifting 
mechanism. Fictional names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refer from their inception 
to mental files but the files themselves are not represented in the mind of the 
authors. As is well-known, ascriptions of intentional states to thinkers can be 
interpreted either transparently or opaquely. On the transparent 
interpretation, intentional states express relations between thinkers and 
objects, independently of how the objects in question are characterized. 
According to the opaque interpretation, intentional relations involve objects 
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3 On this theme, see also Orlando (2021b, pp. 129–130).
4 For more on this problem, see Losada (2016) and Goodman and Gray (2020).
that are characterized in a  particular way. Orlando argued that ascribing 
a  simulative intention to an author “must be interpreted in the transparent, 
not in the opaque, sense – in other terms, it is true on the transparent, not 
on the opaque, interpretation” (Orlando, 2021a, p. 83). 
Now, I believe she was right in this regard. If ascription of intentional states 
to authors is interpreted in this way, it becomes more difficult to reject the 
hypothesis that fictional names refer to mental files. By using our theoretical 
vocabulary, we can explain adequately what happened when Conan Doyle 
introduced the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ into his narrative. By and large, 
the upshot will be that he opened a mental file, HOLMES, and referred with 
the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ to this file by performing a  simulative 
intentional act. But we need not assume that Conan Doyle himself was 
acquainted with the theoretical notions of ‘mental file’ and ‘simulative 
intention’.
Orlando’s  response to my critique shed also light on a  further aspect of the 
debate about fictional narratives. As already mentioned, there is 
an  interpretive problem concerning fictional names because our reading 
experiences suggest that the semantic profile of such names corresponds to 
the semantic profile of ordinary names: we tend to think, quite naturally, that 
‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Sigourney Weaver’ can equally be used to refer to 
persons. But obviously Holmes is a fictional character, not a person. So we are 
faced with a pressing ontological question: what kind of objects are fictional 
characters? Orlando’s  fictional file theory offers a  clear answer to this 
question. If we accept that fictional names refer to mental files, then there is 
no need to rely on auxiliary ontological assumptions: it can be said that the 
HOLMES file is the Holmes character.3 And given that the HOLMES file is to 
be understood as a concept-type – grounded on tokens of concepts occurring 
in Conan Doyle’s mind –, the Holmes character may be identified, in the end, 
with a certain kind of abstract object.
Fictional realists who conceive of fictional characters as abstract objects may find 
this theory congenial. But they may also think that the success of the adaptation 
of mental file theory to fiction is still questionable. I want to mention briefly two 
possible difficulties concerning this project. The first is the so-called 
containment problem.4 Mental files as concept-types are thought of as 
containing (mis)information in the form of mental predicates. Now, consider the 
following fiction-external occurrence of fictional names: ‘Holmes is smarter than 
Poirot’. What is the correct rendering of this sentence? If it is Holmes is smarter 
than ___, then the expressed information belongs to the HOLMES file. If it is ___ 
smarter than Poirot, then the expressed information belongs to the POIROT file. If 
the expressed information is the full proposition that Holmes is smarter than 
Poirot, then it must belong to both files. How could we decide between these 
possibilities? My impression is that mental file theory in its present form cannot 
provide a principled solution to this problem.
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5 The idea can be traced back to Kamp (2015). For a more systematic elaboration of 
the representationalist stance, see Vecsey (2019).
6 The artifactual view of fictional objects has been first articulated in Thomasson (1999). 
The second difficulty arises from synonymy relations between concepts. Let us 
assume that Conan Doyle introduced the name of his protagonist by tokening 
in his mind the concept bachelor. Thus the HOLMES file, the concept-type, 
must be seen as having been grounded (partly) on this token concept. Now, it is 
not unreasonable to think that the concepts bachelor and unmarried man have 
the same extension. A  case like this would raise the following question: is it 
plausible to think that the HOLMES file has also been grounded on the concept 
unmarried man? Synonymy considerations would dictate a ‘yes’ answer. But the 
fact that Conan Doyle has not tokened the concept unmarried man in his mind 
would imply that the answer is ‘no’. It is difficult to see, again, how mental file 
theorists could provide a principled answer to this question.
Orlando argues persuasively that mental files (i.e. fictional characters) can also 
be understood as mental representations (Orlando, 2021a, p. 79; 2021b, p. 111). 
It is worth noting that there is an alternative view, which defines fictional 
characters not in terms of mental representation but in terms of linguistic 
representation.5 Interestingly, these rival views evaluate the ontological status 
of characters in a rather similar way. While some fictional realists contend that 
characters come into being as cultural artifacts, a  specific type of abstract 
object, the mental file theory does not posit such peculiar objects.6 The 
linguistic view rejects the enlargement of the ontology of the domain 
of fiction, too. The central idea is that we need not go beyond the analysis of 
abstract linguistic structures because the objects of our inquiry are given to us 
already at the level of these structures. According to this view, the primary 
source of our knowledge of fictional characters lies in our personal reading 
experiences. When we read Conan Doyle’s detective novel, we find in the text 
a great number of different kinds of representation pertaining to the properties 
of the main protagonist of the novel. The distinctive feature of these linguistic 
representations is that they have a  non-relational semantic profile: Holmes-
representations are non-binary in the sense that they lack extra-linguistic 
representata. These non-relational representations constitute an integrated 
abstract network in the novel. From an ontological point of view, one can say 
that this abstract, non-relational representational network is the Holmes 
character.
In favour of the latter view, it may be noted that within the linguistic 
framework the containment problem loses its force. The fiction-external 
sentence ‘Holmes is smarter than Poirot’ can be interpreted as making 
a comparison between two distinct representational networks. The truth value 
of the informational content expressed by this sentence will depend on the 
details of the applied method of comparison. Synonymy relations do not pose 
insurmountable problems for the linguistic framework, either. If Conan 
Doyle’s text represents Holmes (non-relationally) as being a bachelor, then this 
property is an integral part of the representational network. The fiction-
external sentence ‘Holmes is an unmarried man’ can be interpreted as adding 
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a  new property to the original (non-relational) representational network. 
Whether this addition is acceptable or not depends on how one evaluates the 
semantic relationship between the expressions ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’.
Although the linguistic framework can offer plausible solutions to the above-
mentioned two problems, it would be hasty to conclude that it has a  higher 
overall explanatory power than Orlando’s  mental file theory. The explanatory 
cost-benefit relation between these views is, in a  certain sense, symmetric. 
By  applying the linguistic framework, one can elucidate the way in which 
authors of fictional texts construe representations from natural language 
expressions but the mental counterparts of these representations remain 
largely unexplained in this framework. In contrast, the mental file theory 
provides suitable means to analyse the structure and dynamics of mental 
representations of fictional objects but the linguistic aspects of these 
representations fall outside the scope of this theory. If this is a  correct 
description of the present research situation, then it would be advantageous to 
find an appropriate explanatory level where the mental and linguistic aspects 
of fictional representations can be studied simultaneously.
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